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A First Look at the Interim Merits
Award in S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada:
It Is Possible to Balance Legitimate
Environmental Concerns with
Investment Protection
BY TODD WEILER*

In the last issue of this journal, Joseph de Pencier provided a
very interesting paper on investment protection, environmental
protection, and investor-state arbitration under the NAFTA, focusing
on his experience as counsel for Canada in S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada
(Myers).' I have written a reply, based upon my experience as
counsel for the investor in Myers and similar cases. This Article
provides a critical commentary on various elements of Mr. de
Pencier's paper that deal with the Myers claim, having the benefit of
being drafted in the wake of an interim award issued by the Myers
tribunal on November 12, 2000. With its award, the Myers tribunal
found that Canada violated two substantive provisions of the NAFTA
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Law & Policy, Dundee University, Scotland; Adjunct Professor, University of
Windsor Law School. Mr. Weiler is an Ontario-based attorney who advises public
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and owed compensation to Myers as a result.2 The paper concludes
by providing some tentative suggestions as to how the substantive
provisions of NAFTA Chapter 11 might be interpreted in order to
ensure that a balance is maintained in future cases where the
objectives of investment protection and environmental protection
appear to be at odds.
I. Environmental Protection Versus Investment Protection:
Not Always a Valid Dichotomy
The first, and probably most important, conclusion that can be
drawn from the four NAFTA claims that have resulted in merits
awards to date (two final and two partial), is that there has yet to be a
true test of the alleged dichotomy between protecting investment and
protecting the environment. While three of the cases did involve
environmentally sensitive waste treatment businesses, and the other
case involved a lumber business, none of the claims turned on an
environmental protection issue. This is not to say that people have
not tried to use environmental policy to justify the treatment of the
investors and investments in these cases-only that none of the
tribunals hearing these claims found that environmental protection
was at the heart of any of them.
The first case, Azinian v. United Mexican States,3 essentially
involved a contract dispute between a Mexican municipality and a
waste contractor from the United States. The tribunal essentially
concluded that the investor had no case because it was unable to fulfil
the terms of its contract, and that the municipality accordingly had
every right, in international law, to end it. The second case, Pope &
Talbot, Inc. v. Canada,4 which has so far resulted in a partial merits
award denying the investor's claims under NAFTA Articles 1106 and
1110, involved the deleterious impact of an export control regime on
U.S. lumber investments in Canada.5 The third case, Metalclad Corp.
2. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada (U.S.-Can.), NAFTA/UNCITRAL Tribunal,
(Nov.
13,
2000)
[hereinafter
Myers],
available
at
http://www.appletonlaw.com/cases/Myers%20-%20Final%2OMerits%20Award.pdf.
3. Azinian v. Mexico, NAFTAIICSID Tribunal, No. ARB(AF)97/2 (1999), 14
ICSID Rav. 538 (1999).
4. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Interim Award, NAFTA/UNCITRAL
Tribunal (Jun. 26, 2000), reprintedin 23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 455 (2000)
[hereinafter Pope & Talbot].
5. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. The Pope & Talbot tribunal held a hearing
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v. United Mexican States,6 involved the expropriation and unfair and
inequitable treatment of the investment of a U.S. investor in the
waste treatment business, including a last-minute "environmental
decree" that would have rendered the business useless even if it had
been able to overcome all other questionable attempts by state and
local governments to prevent it from competing against local
businesses. The final case, Myers,7 involved an overtly discriminatory
course of government conduct aimed at preventing a U.S. investor
and its investment from being able to compete in the Canadian
market for destroying PCB wastes.
Of course, although none of these cases involved an actual
conflict between investment and environmental values, there is
nonetheless a serious risk that investors in other cases may attempt to
use the provisions of NAFTA Chapter 11 to seek damages for the
imposition of legitimate environmental measures that harm their
businesses. The question is whether NAFTA tribunals have been
provided with the tools necessary to deny unmeritorious claims for
compensation arising from legitimate environmental measures, but
nonetheless identify cases where environmental policy is being used
as little more than a shield to obscure arbitrary or discriminatory
treatment of a foreign investor. Before addressing this question, it
might be useful to study the anatomy of a case where the provisions
of NAFTA were properly applied to prevent environmental policy
from being used to justify arbitrary and discriminatory conduct. For
this task, we shall use the Myers claim.
The Myers claim involved a very dangerous (and hence a
symbolically potent) hazardous substance: PCB waste. It would be
understandable for a person to hear that an investment claim has
been brought concerning PCB wastes and worry about the potential
for investment and environmental conflict. However, Myers and its
Canadian investment were not PCB waste producers. Moreover, they
did not store PCB wastes (as thousands of Canadian businesses were
doing in 1995, with no feasible domestic destruction options available
on the investor's claims under NAFTA Articles 1102 and 1105 in November 2000.
The export control regime was imposed by Canada in order to implement an
agreement it had struck with the U.S. government to avoid the leveling of what are
arguably WTO-inconsistent countervailing duties against softwood lumber being

imported to the United States from Canada.
6. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, NAFTA/ICSID Tribunal, No. ARB(AF)/97/1

(Sept. 2, 2000) [hereinafter Metalclad].
7. Myers, supra note 2.
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to them); and they certainly did not landfill PCB wastes!

Rather,

Myers was a leading U.S. PCB waste remediator that invested in
Canada so that it could supply Canadian customers with the same
exclusive PCB waste destruction system that it had been successfully
offering to U.S. customers for years.' Myers' final treatment facility
was located in Ohio, thousands of miles closer to the vast majority of
Canadian-held PCB wastes than its only large Canadian competitor, a
former provincial-government-owned business with an incinerator
located in Northern Alberta.
Myers offered Canadian waste holders the opportunity to

destroy their wastes with a safe, secure and economically efficient
method.
Unsurprisingly, then, when Canadian environmental
officials originally briefed their minister about the affordable
alternative being presented by Myers, they made such arguments as:
-"[Destroying
PCBs] in either country is positive for the
environment and offers greater cost-effective choice of PCB
destruction for PCB owners."
-The export of PCB wastes to the United States for destruction is
"consistent

with the Canada-U.S.A. Agreement
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes."

on

the

-Alternatives to preventing Myers from being able to export PCB
wastes to the United States for treatment and destruction include
merely imposing sufficient insurance requirements on waste

exporters, or allowing the increased competition to encourage new
Canadian entrants into the market for PCB waste destruction.'0
8. Although certainly not sufficient, it could be argued that landfilling in a
secure site would have been safer than the "temporary" above-ground storage sites
that had been cropping up by the thousand all over Ontario and Quebec because of a
lack of options for permanent destruction in 1995, when Myers attempted to enter
the Canadian market.
9. Myers' system involved the chemical dechlorination of PCB wastes such as
old transformers, capacitors and ballasts, which resulted in the generation of
thousands of tons of scrap metal that would otherwise have been buried, burned or
left in storage until an affordable destruction option materialized.
10. These examples are drawn from briefing memoranda that were originally
made public through a domestic court challenge brought by PCB waste holders
against the Minister of the Environment for using the emergency provisions of
Canada's environmental protection legislation in an illegal manner in order to bypass the normal regulatory amendment process that would not have allowed her to
immediately foreclose on the Myers' option. For a more detailed account of these
documents, see Todd Weiler, Application of the Federal Regulatory Policy to
Regulatory Decision-Making: The Curious Case of the 1995 PCB Waste Export
Interim Order,4 CAN. J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 181 (1999).
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Given these comments, why did Canada impose a ban on PCB waste
exports, effectively foreclosing upon the ability of Myers and its
investment to compete in the Canadian market? In its award, the
Myers tribunal provided a rather succinct answer: "[T]he protectionist
intent of the lead minister in this matter was reflected in decisionmaking at every stage that led to the [PCB waste export] ban."'"
Canada's environment minister, Sheila Copps, had been lobbied
heavily by Myers' Canadian competitors, using a lobbyist who had
only months earlier been employed on her personal staff. These
competitors had even secured a promise from the minister that if
Myers ever received permission from the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to import PCBs from Canada for
These
destruction, she would close the border immediately.
competitors regularly updated the minister and high level officials
about Myers' activities to open the border, including Myers'
attendance at various public hearings held by the EPA concerning the
possibility of opening the border. Canadian officials certainly knew
of the existence of these EPA hearings (the latest of which was held
in the spring of 1995), but apparently never decided to make their
own submissions to the EPA about the subject.
The Myers tribunal did not shy away from making the kind of
findings that the damning official memoranda required. It concluded
that "the documentary record as a whole clearly indicates that the
[export ban was] intended primarily to protect the Canadian PCB
disposal industry from U.S. competition" and that "Canada [had]
produced no convincing witness testimony to rebut the thrust of the
documentary evidence."12 This evidence even included a handwritten note between senior officials considering making an
extraordinary request of their legal counsel to write directly to their
minister advising her of the "serious legal problems" they had with
her proposed course of conduct, in the hopes that "it might make it
the Minister of the Environment to accept contrary
easier for
13
advice!"
When faced with a clear set of marching orders from their
minister, officials nonetheless attempted to explain to her the
ramifications of her demands. For example, on October 30, 1995, the
Director of the Hazardous Waste Branch in the Canadian
11. Myers, supra note 2,
12- Id. 194.
13. Id.

180.

162.
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Department of the Environment wrote the following memorandum:
Possible Immediate Action the Minister Could Take re PCB
Export
1.

Obtain immediately an Interim Order under Section 35 of
[the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA)] (go
straight to Gazette I immediately with no public
consultation).

2.

Make a public statement that the U.S. has opened its
borders to PCBs from Canada, that this is contrary to her
longstanding position that Canadian PCBs should be
destroyed in this country.

PROS: The Canadian environmental industry investment, i.e.
Chem-Security is protected by a secure supply of PCBs for
their facility in Swan Hills [Alberta].
CONS: Interim Orders are design [sic] to provide immediate action
to resolve "significant danger" to the environment and/or
human health. It can be argued that the opening of the
U.S. border poses no such significant danger.
S.D. Myers will certainly seek redress through NAFTA
intervention, since they have invested/lobbied greatly to get
the border opened. The company can be expected to object
formally to any action taken under CEPA to close the
border.
It will be difficult to argue that the transportation of PCBs
to the U.S.A. poses a greater danger than transporting
PCBs to Swan Hills Alberta.
[The Canadian Departments of] Industry Canada and
Foreign Affairs are likely to object to the closing of the
Canadian border because it will appear to be an
unjustifiable restriction on international trade.
Current practice of returning U.S.-owned PCBs in Canada
to their originators in the U.S. will be jeopardized if the
Canadian border is completely shut. An "escape hatch"
will have to be provided.
Later, the same official wrote an urgent memorandum-just five
14. Memorandum of George Cornwall, Director, Hazardous Waste Branch,
Department of the Environment, Canada (Oct. 30,1995) (on file with author).
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days before Myers would have been able to start competing in
Canada-in which he expressed his "crucial and problematic"
concern that his staff was still unable "to come up with any persuasive
rationale to cover 'significant danger to the environment or to human
health"' (the standard required under Canada's environmental
legislation to issue an emergency order to close the border).15 This
does not sound like the. mind of an official who was convinced that
government action was urgently needed to protect the environment.
In fact, the documentary evidence before the tribunal completely
contradicted the Canadian argument, reflected in the de Pencier
article,16 that urgent action was needed to ensure that the EPA's
decision (to allow Myers to import PCB wastes, and therefore
compete in the Canadian waste treatment market) was not dangerous
for the Canadian environment.
These official documents demonstrated that Canadian officials,
far from being unaware that Myers had an investment in Canada,
actually knew that Myers' Canadian business would be severely
damaged by their actions, and that Myers would likely use the
NAFTA in response. They show that Canadian officials initially had
little or no concern about how the EPA had given Myers its
approval, 7 and no concern that exporting PCB wastes to the United
States might be inconsistent with Canada's international
environmental obligations.18 In the words of the tribunal, "[T]here
was no legitimate environmental reason for introducing the ban.
Insofar as there was an indirect environmental objective-to keep the
Canadian industry strong in order to assure a continued disposal
capacity-it could have been achieved by other measures."'"

15. Memorandum of George Cornwall, Director, Hazardous Waste Branch,

Department of the Environment, Canada, to H. A. Clarke (Nov. 10, 1995) (on file
with author).
16. de Pencier, supra note 1, at 412-16.
17. The EPA granted a time-limited "enforcement discretion" to Myers to
import PCB wastes from Canada explicitly for destruction in their EPA-approved
facilities. At the time, only Myers was granted such permission, in advance of a
general rule that the EPA issued later the following year. It is interesting to note that
the vast majority of all PCB wastes present in Canada were originally manufactured
in the United States, and so this permission to import might well be seen as nothing

more than a "repatriation" of these PCBs.
18. See Myers, supra note 2, [1 204-11.
19. Id.

195.
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H. Article 1102: National Treatment
The Myers tribunal unanimously concluded that Canada's
treatment of Myers and its investment in Canada violated NAFTA
Article 1102, which requires NAFTA governments to accord
treatment to NAFTA investors and investments that is no less
favorable than that which it accords to their domestic investors and
investments, providing that the treatment is accorded in like
circumstances.0
To reach this conclusion, the tribunal first
determined whether Myers and its competitors should be accorded
treatment in like circumstances. It did so by concluding that Myers
and the companies that had successfully lobbied the minister to
prevent it from exporting PCB wastes to the United States were
obviously in direct competition with each other in the Canadian
market for PCB waste destruction. Regardless of whether these
businesses used identical destruction processes, or whether they
utilized facilities only in Canada or in Canada and the United States,
they were both active in the Canadian market, trying to convince
PCB waste holders to do business with them and not the other."
Accordingly, it was incumbent upon Canada to treat Myers no less
favorably than it did its domestic competitors. Second, the tribunal
decided that Canada had offered "less favorable treatment" to Myers
because its export ban effectively prevented Myers from competing in
the Canadian market.
It is submitted that this is exactly the kind of result that NAFTA
Article 1102 was designed to address: providing compensation
whenever a government measure upsets the natural, competitive
equality that should exist between foreign and domestic investors and
investments. NAFTA Article 1116 provides that a NAFTA investor
20. Id.
238-57.
21. Myers demonstrated its "investment" in the Canadian market in at least five

ways: (1) it had an affiliate company in Canada; (2) to which it had made substantial
loans; (3) with which it was working in common cause (i.e. a joint venture). Myers
also demonstrated that the activities of its own employees and commitment of capital
in Canada demonstrated that (4) it had a branch in Canada. Finally, Myers
demonstrated that (5) it had acquired a dominant share of the Canadian market
through extensive sales and marketing efforts prior to opening the border. The
tribunal unanimously determined that Myers had an "investment" in Canada, under
the extensive definition that exists in NAFrA, and accordingly did not find it
necessary to make specific findings on how or whether each particular type of
economic activity qualified as an investment in order for it to have standing under
Article 1116 to bring a claim. It was satisfied that Myers' Canadian affiliate was
controlled by Myers, through the person of Dana Myers, who was a one quarter
owner and president of both companies. Id. [ 222-32.
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can make a claim for the losses that it incurs as a result of a breach of
provisions such as NAFTA Article 1102. Because Canada effectively
stopped Myers and its investment in Canada from competing in the
Canadian PCB waste treatment market for sixteen months (at a time
when they would have held a dominant market position), the tribunal
found that Canada was liable for paying compensation to Myers for
all of its losses, so long as they could be directly traced to Canada's
inappropriate behavior in relation to it or its investment.' The
tribunal found that such compensation was due simply because
Canada had failed to prove that this case was really about
environmental protection.
But what is there to prevent a different NAFTA investor from
using Article 1102 to seek damages for "less favorable" treatment
that results from the proper application of a legitimate environmental
law? What if the "treatment" in question is less favorable because an
environmental regulation prohibits the investor from using an
environmentally dangerous manufacturing process that is not
employed by its domestic competitors, but that would be very costly
to change? The investor could argue that it is entitled to
compensation because it operates in like circumstances with domestic
competitors and is receiving less favorable treatment than they are
receiving under the same regulation. It might even be able to provide
some circumstantial evidence that regulators knew their measure
would impact more harshly upon them, or foreigners as a group.
Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), prima facie
breaches of national treatment provisions similar to NAFTA Article
1102 can be excused through the application of general exemption
provisions.' Even if the measure upsets the equality of competitive
opportunities that should exist between foreign and domestic
businesses, thus violating a national treatment obligation, government
action could nonetheless be justified so long as it was "related" to the
preservation of the environment or "necessary" to protect human,
plant or animal health (and was not applied in an arbitrary or
discriminatory manner). The NAFTA contains a general exemption
provision, Article 2102, but it specifically provides that it does not
apply to investment obligations, such as Article 1102. Chapter 11
only contains a hortatory environmental provision, Article 1114(1),
22. Id.

311-19.

23. E.g., GATT art. XX; GATS art. XIV.
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which permits NAFTA governments to impose measures they believe
will ensure that investment activities are "undertaken in a manner
sensitive to environmental concerns, 21 only if they are otherwise
consistent with the obligations contained within Chapter 11. Similar
hortatory statements about the need to promote "sustainable
development" and to act in "a manner consistent with environmental
protection and conservation"' can also be found in the NAFTA's
preamble, but hortatory statements cannot generally be used to
override mandatory treaty obligations such as NAFTA Article 1102.
Nonetheless, the very fact that NAFTA Article 1102 has not
been modified by an environmental exemption provision may provide
sufficient reason as to why it should be interpreted in a slightly
different manner than the GATT and GATS national treatment
provisions. Successive NAFTA tribunals have declared that the
NAFTA's terms must be interpreted in good faith, in accordance with
their ordinary meaning, in the context within which they appear, and
in light of the objects and purposes of the treaty.
While
environmental protection is not listed among the objectives provided
in NAFTA Article 102, the requirement that the NAFTA's terms be
interpreted in good faith may be of assistance. The principle of good
faith is a fundamental element of international law. and under
Article 1131(1), tribunals are directed to decide the issues in dispute
before them in accordance with the provisions of NAFTA and with
the applicable rules of "international law." Observing the principle of
good faith requires a tribunal to be mindful of the totality of the
international obligations that are borne by NAFTA Parties, including
environmental treaty obligations and international law principles such
as precaution, proportionality and necessity and to endeavor to
interpret NAFTA's provisions in a fashion that avoids conflicts
between them.
One solution to the problem of a missing general exemption for
24. NAFTA, art. 1114(1), 32 I.L.M. at 642.
25. NAFTA, Preamble, 32 I.L.M. 289,297 (1993).
26. See J. F. O'CONNOR, GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW

(1991);

BIN

CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS (1994).

27. There is considerable debate as to whether the precautionary principle
constitutes an international law norm. Proportionality and necessity are concepts
that can be seen running through various bodies of public and private international
law. Though it is beyond the scope of this Article to inquire as to their application in
the international environmental policy context, these issues do form the subject of
some of my continuing research.
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NAFrA Article 1102 is to read an exemption into its "like
circumstances" test, in good faith, and in accordance with
international environmental law principles. After all, it would hardly
be a just or fair result, keeping in mind the hortatory statements
about protection of the environment appearing throughout the
NAFTA text, for a tribunal to find that competing investments should
be treated in "like circumstances" despite the fact that their economic
environmental
dissimilar
substantially
generate
activities
externalities. Interpreting NAFTA Article 1102 in a fashion that
promotes reasonable and balanced environmental protection hardly
seems inconsistent with the goals and objectives of the NAFTA, and
can be supported by the plain language of the NAFTA text.
Support for this kind of interpretive approach can be found in
the Myers Award, which recalled the international environmental
principles contained within the Rio Convention and the North
American Agreement on Economic Cooperation to suggest the need
for a balanced approach to environmental measures that may have
the effect of distorting trade and development.' A five-member
panel struck under the NAFTA's state-to-state dispute settlement
provisions (to hear Mexico's complaint that the United States was
arbitrarily discriminating against the cross-border provision of
trucking services and investment in the trucking industry) appears to
have come to this same conclusion, going so far as to refer to the "like
circumstances" wording of NAFTA Article 1102 as constituting a
potential "exemption" from the national treatment principle of
competitive equality for all similarly situated businesses.' Of course,
the availability of such an exemption would be conditional upon a
NAFTA government's being able to prove that its measure was
applied in a fair and balanced manner. In the Trucking case, the
United States was unable to demonstrate how its measure was
environmentally justified, as it was applied in an unnecessarily
restrictive and arbitrary fashion that discriminated against Mexican
investors and their investments.
28. Myers, supra note 2,

246-48,250.

29. See NAFTA Arbitral Panel Decision in the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking
292-93 (Feb. 6, 2001) [hereinafter Trucking],
Services, USA-MEX-98-2008-01,
available at http://www.naftalaw.org/Trucking%20Services%20Award.pdf (applying
its analysis of the national treatment and most favored treatment provisions of the

NAFTA Chapter on cross-border trade in services). The similarity of interpretation
of national treatment provisions in both cases is most likely not a coincidence, given
that the same person chaired both panels: Martin Hunter, one of the world's leading
experts on international commercial arbitration.
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111. NAFTA Article 1105: Treatment in Accordance with
International Law
A similar approach can be used in the interpretation of NAFTA
Article 1105. Article 1105 states that NAFTA governments must
treat investments "in accordance with international law, including fair
and equitable treatment and full protection and security."' As I have
described elsewhere," NAFTA Article 1105 simply requires
investments to be treated "in accordance with international law," and
sets out two examples of such treatment. "Full protection and
security" is an old concept that has received consideration by various
mixed claims tribunals over the past century, involving the obligation
of governments to protect investments against losses suffered as a
result of maladministration or .enforcement failures. 2 "Fair and
equitable treatment" has just received detailed consideration by the
Metalclad tribunal, which concluded that providing "fair and
equitable treatment" requires governments to act in a transparent
manner, to provide investors with a fair hearing, to not make
decisions on the basis of irrelevant factors or with insufficient
evidence, and to not frustrate the legitimate expectations of investors
(when they are raised as a result of government conduct).
A
majority of the Myers tribunal also appears to have concluded that
intentional discrimination on the basis of nationality constitutes a
breach of international law and, therefore, a breach of NAFTA
Article 1105.'
The "international law" referred to in NAFTA Article 1105 also
includes international environmental law, whether in the form of
customary international law, international environmental principles,
or obligations contained within international environmental treaties.
While a NAFTA investor may be able to construct a credible
argument that the treatment accorded to its investment under some
30. NAFTA, art. 1105, 32 I.L.M. at 639.
31. Todd J. Weiler, 2000 in Review: Investor-State Dispute Settlement Gains
Steam, INT'L LAW. (forthcoming 2001); Todd J. Weiler, Investor-State Arbitration
Under the NAFTA: Remedies for Poor Regulatory Treatment, 6 INT'L TRADE L. &
REG. 84 (2000).
32. See RUDOLPH DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES 60 (1995).
33. Metalclad, supra note 6, IT 51-52, 80, 88, 91-92.
34. Myers, supra note 2,
266-68. In so doing, the tribunal demonstrated an
adherence to the practice of "judicial economy" becoming common in the WTO and
decided not to consider the remainder of Myers' arguments under NAFTA Article
1105.
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environmental measure was substantively unfair or inequitable (as
opposed to the procedural type of unfairness discussed in the
Metalclad award), it would remain open for a NAFTA Party to justify
the apparently unfair impact of its measure through recourse to any
number of international environmental obligations or principles. The
same principles could be used to explain how a measure that
discriminated against an investment on the basis of nationality could
be justified as conduct authorized by an international environmental
obligation, such as a prohibition on trade in endangered species.'
IV. NAFHA Article 1110: Expropriation
The final NAFTA provision that has been the subject of
considerable environmental concern is NAFTA Article 1110, which
provides in part:
1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an
investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a
measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an
investment ("expropriation"), except:
(a) for a public purpose;
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis;
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2
through 6.
2. Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the
expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation
took place ("date of expropriation"), and shall not reflect any
change in value occurring because the intended expropriation had
become known earlier. Valuation criteria shall include going
concern value, asset value including declared tax value of tangible
property, and other criteria, as appropriate, to determine fair
market valueO
NAIFTA Article 1110 requires compensation to be paid for
government measures that have the effect of directly or indirectly
expropriating foreign investments. While the international law of
35. The balancing tests employed by the WTO Appellate Body to apply the
GATT Article XX general exemption to prima facie GAT' breaches in the Shrimp /
Turtle and Gasolinecases may be of particular assistance in this regard.
36. NAFTA, art. 1110, 32 I.L.M. at 641-42.
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expropriation may beat' something in common with U.S. takings
jurisprudence, it is not the same thing, and NAFTA tribunals have, so
far, studiously avoided any reference to the domestic law of
expropriation, which differs dramatically among the NAFTA Parties.
The concern that many have identified in respect of NAFTA
Article 1110 is that what appears to be an exception at the end of the
first paragraph is really not an exception at all. Subject to certain
conditions covered elsewhere, 37 NAFTA Article 1110 requires
compensation to be paid for all measures that have the effect of
substantially interfering with an investment.3 It does not matter
whether the measure is discriminatory, of general or specific
application, or imposed in a procedurally unsound manner, so long as
compensation is paid in accordance with the terms of Article 1110."
It does not matter if the NAFTA government claims to be exercising
37. See, e.g., NAFTA, art. 1110(7) (excluding compensation for expropriation by
way of various intellectual property measures), art. 2103(6) (providing a special
approval mechanism for claims in respect of confiscatory taxation measures).
38. The "substantial interference" standard was recalled by the Pope & Talbot
tribunal in its finding that while a Canadian export control measure certainly affected
the claimant's investment, the level of interference involved was not substantial
enough to rise to the level of expropriation under international law. It is unclear
what "substantial" means, although it would appear to involve more than just a 1020% loss of market share for an otherwise profitable company. Pope & Talbot, supra
note 4,
96, 101-02.
39. There has yet to be a NAFTA tribunal award concerning such a measure, as
the only tribunal to make a finding of expropriation under NAFTA Article 1110
made factual determinations that would clearly lead one to conclude that the
expropriation in that case was not only discriminatory but also procedurally defective
and arguably not a valid exercise of public authority. See Metalclad, supra note 6, I
82-96, 110-12. The Mexican government has challenged this award on a number of
grounds in the domestic court of British Columbia, Canada (the site of the
arbitration). While a full analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, it is surprising
to see arguments that because the tribunal erred, the award should be set aside (given
the far stricter standards of review prescribed under the UNCITRAL Model Law
and New York Convention). Accordingly, it is doubtful that Mexico will ultimately
be successful. Moreover, it is not clear that the Metalcladtribunal made any errors in
law. It has been suggested that the tribunal was wrong to conclude that a
questionable ecological decree by the state governor was a "measure tantamount to
expropriation." A simple reading of the entirety of the tribunal's expropriation
findings demonstrates that the tribunal regarded the term "tantamount to
expropriation" as being equivalent to "indirect expropriation"-the current position
of all three NAFTA Parties. Even if the tribunal was wrong to find that the decree
was an indirect expropriation (as opposed to a direct expropriation), it was open to
the tribunal to make such a finding on the facts, and it would clearly not be
appropriate for a domestic court to substitute its opinion for that of an international
tribunal, much less a tribunal chaired by as eminent an international scholar as Sir Eli
Lauterpacht.
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its sovereign authority to regulate (sometimes referred to as the
"police power").' The plain and ordinary meaning of the words of
NAFTA Article 1110, taken in the context of an investment
promotion chapter in a multilateral free trade agreement with
objectives such as substantially increasing investment opportunities,
indicates that in all cases compensation must be paid.
Room for an environmentally sensitive interpretation of
NAFTA's expropriation provision does exist, however, in the level of
compensation that should be paid. Whereas NAFTA Article 1110(1)
obviously enshrines a strong preference for the protection of
investment (by promising compensation for all measures that
substantially interfere with it), Article 1110(2) includes an openended definition of the criteria that may be used in the valuation of
the compensation to be paid for such interference. If the economic
activity undertaken by an investment leads to externalities that are so
damaging to the environment that a government must take regulatory
steps that substantially interfere with that investment, the appropriate
level of compensation for such interference should take into account
the negative value of those externalities. While professional business
valuators may puzzle at the thought of adding "negative
environmental externalities" to a list of criteria that is supposed to be
used to determine the "fair market value" of an investment, it is
incumbent upon treaty interpreters to arrive at a meaning of "other
criteria, as appropriate," in Article 1110(2), that balances the NAFTA
right of investment protection with the fundamental need to protect
human, plant and animal life or health, and the environment
generally.
The Myers tribunal determined that it was not dealing with an
expropriation case. Following the lead suggested by Mr. de Pencier
in his article,"' the tribunal found that the sixteen-month export ban
imposed by Canada to prevent Myers from competing in the
Canadian market for PCB waste reduction was not of sufficient
length to constitute an indirect expropriation under NAFTA Article
1110.2 The Myers tribunal also determined, along with the Pope &
Talbot tribunal, and Mr. de Pencier,4 3 that the words "tantamount to
expropriation" in Article 1110 did not expand the definition of

40.
41.
42.
43.

See Pope & Talbot, supra note 4,
de Pencier, supra note 1, at 414.
Myers, supra note 2, 284.
de Pencier, supra note 1, at 415.
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expropriation under the NAFTA any further than to include indirect
(or "creeping") expropriation."4 However, it seems clear that if the
export ban had been permanent, the tribunal would likely have
determined it to have been an indirect expropriation for which
compensation would have been due.
Given that Myers' investment only provided an answer to the
environmental externalities of PCB use, rather than generating
environmental problems of its own, there would be no need to invoke
the "other criteria, as appropriate" language of Article 1110(2)
because only full compensation would have been appropriate. The
exact quantum of the compensation to be paid to Myers for Canada's
breach of Articles 1102 and 1105 will be the subject of a future
hearing on damages."
Conclusion: Squaring the Circle
The Myers case demonstrates that there is a definite need for
investment protection in the NAFTA, as blatantly discriminatory
measures can apparently emerge even from a country such as
Canada, with a stable government, fully functioning legal institutions,
and a highly developed economy. NAFTA tribunals must have the
analytical tools to sort through the legitimate and less-than-legitimate
justifications provided by governments for measures that harm
NAFTA investments. The Myers Award provides an excellent
example of how to undertake such an analysis. In the event that
another case arises where environmental protection is really at the
heart of a measure, the aforementioned analytical tools can be
employed to ensure that that protection is not jeopardized.

44. Myers, supra note 2, 286 (citing Pope & Talbot, supra note 4, 104).
45. The government of Canada has taken the unusual step of asking a domestic
court to strike down the Myers award for being contrary to the "public policy" of
Canada and an illegal usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the tribunal (even
though Canada failed to bring any jurisdictional challenges before-or even afterthe pleadings were closed). It would be inappropriate to comment upon the chances
of success for Canada's application while domestic judicial proceedings are
underway.

